In recent months, the narrative promoted by the U.S. government and its tech industry allies has painted a picture of American dominance in global semiconductor manufacturing and technological innovation. Yet, this portrayal is increasingly strained under scrutiny. While officials trumpet plans to protect and expand U.S. leadership through initiatives like the CHIPS Act, the reality reveals a fragile veneer of sovereignty that is deeply intertwined with foreign dynasty—particularly Taiwan and its semiconductor giant, TSMC. The assumption that Washington can effectively control or even strategically influence the global silicon supply chain is, at best, optimistic and at worst, dangerously naive.
Jensen Huang’s recent praise for Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) emerges as a glaring manifestation of this paradox. While he lauds TSMC as one of humanity’s greatest companies, his comments underscore an uncomfortable truth: the U.S. remains heavily dependent on foreign firms that now occupy a central position in the semiconductor ecosystem. The United States’ efforts to nurture domestic chip production through financial incentives and legislative measures are largely reactionary and insufficient to break TSMC’s global hegemony. Instead, they reveal a recognition—possibly too late—that American technological sovereignty is illusory when the backbone of its advanced chip supply hinges on a foreign company in Taiwan.
Capitulation in the Face of Global Supply Chain Realities
The reality is that despite U.S. subsidies and strategic efforts, the world’s most advanced chips are predominantly crafted by TSMC in Taiwan. Washington’s push for more local manufacturing, exemplified by promises of billions in investment and the construction of plant facilities in Arizona, appears more like a symbolic gesture than a genuine shift in the global balance of power. A multinational chip industry cannot be reoriented overnight, nor can it be divorced from the geopolitical tensions that loom over cross-strait relations.
Furthermore, the U.S. government’s discussion about acquiring stakes in semiconductor companies such as Intel, Micron, and even TSMC adds a layer of skepticism around the practicality of its ambitions. Equity stakes can provide some control, but they do little to alter the fundamental dependency on Taiwanese manufacturing. The influence wielded by TSMC’s strategic partners and suppliers across Asia and the world renders American efforts almost insignificant in comparison to the entrenched complexity of the supply chain.
This overreliance on TSMC, especially during a period of heightened geopolitical tensions, illustrates a fundamental flaw in U.S. policy: it’s building a fortress around an essentially fragile ecosystem. The long-term sustainability of American technological leadership depends not solely on legislation or promises, but on diversifying and decentralizing the semiconductor industry—a task that appears increasingly out of reach.
American Hegemony in Decline—A Strategic Reckoning
The prominent role of TSMC and other Asian companies in the global chip market serves as a stark reminder that U.S. technological supremacy is neither as stable nor as secure as it seems. The Biden administration’s initiatives—while seemingly robust—are largely reactive maneuvers within an already globalized supply chain that they cannot fully control. The idea that a government can reshape a sector as complex and geographically distributed as semiconductors is deeply flawed, especially when the geopolitical stakes are so high.
What this reveals is not just a failure of policy but a fundamental weakness in the center-wing liberal approach that champions free markets but underestimates the geopolitical and strategic importance of technological infrastructure. Washington’s focus on incentivizing domestic manufacturing overlooks the brutal reality: technology sovereignty is a myth when key players like TSMC operate beyond the direct influence of any single government.
This dependency threatens to undermine the very techno-nationalist narratives that U.S. policymakers are eager to promote. As global supply chains become increasingly inseparable from geopolitical rivalries, the U.S. must recognize that technological dominance is more fragile and interconnected than ever before. It is high time for a candid reassessment—recognizing that American leadership depends not just on financial incentives but on rethinking its entire approach to innovation, diplomacy, and global economic integration.
The Fallacy of Self-Reliance and the Need for Strategic Realism
The American obsession with “winning” the semiconductor race overlooks a crucial truth: no nation can truly dominate this field alone. The mythology of technological independence fosters illusions that can distract from the real challenge—building resilient, cooperative international frameworks that acknowledge mutual dependence. The current stance of investing billions domestically while turning a blind eye to the geopolitical realities elsewhere risks fostering a false sense of security.
Furthermore, praising TSMC as a pinnacle of innovation while simultaneously hinting at the possibility of Washington acquiring a stake in it reflects a confusing stance—one that vacillates between admiration and opportunism. Such mixed signals only serve to undermine the credibility of U.S. policy and demonstrate a lack of strategic clarity. It’s clear that the future of global technology leadership will rely more on diplomacy, mutual trust, and shared infrastructure than on unilateral efforts or isolated national champions.
In the final analysis, the U.S. must confront the uncomfortable truth: it cannot force innovation, control international supply chains, or impose geopolitical will on a complex, globalized industry. Instead, it should aim to foster genuine collaboration and develop a strategic posture that recognizes the interconnectedness of modern technology. Anything less is an illusion—one that could very well accelerate America’s decline from the tech summit to a subordinate position in the digital age.